The period roughly fifteen years after World War I was marked by a precarious peace in Europe. However, the rise of the Nazi party in Germany and Adolf Hitler’s ascent to power in 1933 cast a dark shadow over the continent. European leaders, haunted by the memories of the previous global conflict, desperately sought to avoid another war. This desperation led to the policy of appeasement – but was this approach the right way to deal with Hitler’s ambitions?
The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 had left Germany economically devastated, contributing to mass unemployment by the early 1930s. This environment of hardship played a significant role in Hitler’s rise, as he capitalized on public resentment towards the treaty’s harsh terms.
“He had gained support by denouncing the Versailles Treaty of 1919 and the harsh terms it inflicted on Germany after the First World War,” explains Kate Clements, IWM Curator.
One of the treaty’s stipulations was to prevent Germany from re-arming. However, Hitler had different plans. He withdrew Germany from the League of Nations and disarmament talks, and in 1935 announced a German rearmament program, directly violating the Versailles Treaty. Germany began to rebuild its military, and in March 1936, German troops remilitarized the Rhineland, a region in western Germany. Hitler also initiated the annexation of territories he considered rightfully German, beginning with Austria in March 1938, an event known as the ‘Anschluss’.
Despite these aggressive actions, Western powers remained largely passive. They adopted a policy of appeasement, conceding to the demands of a potentially hostile nation in the hope of maintaining peace.
The Rationale Behind Appeasement
Several factors contributed to the adoption of appeasement.
Kate Clements notes, “People struggled to understand the new threats of extreme nationalism in Germany, Japan and Italy. Their governments also had domestic priorities to address, which provided a distraction from foreign affairs.”
Domestically, Britain, for example, was heavily influenced by public opinion, with a widespread belief that the British public would not support another war. Furthermore, a segment of the British aristocracy held favorable views of Hitler, and antisemitism was present in British society at the time. Many major newspapers also initially wrote positively about Hitler in the 1930s. Critically, many failed to recognize the true extent of the threat Hitler posed until it was too late.
Alt text: Neville Chamberlain, holding the Munich Agreement, is cheered by crowds upon his return to Britain, symbolizing the initial public optimism about appeasement.
Hitler’s expansionist aims were clearly outlined in his 1925 book, Mein Kampf. Yet, remarkably few senior politicians in Britain or France read it. Had they done so, they would have encountered his extremist ideology, violent antisemitism, the concept of a German master race needing “living space,” and his plans for German unification and expansion.
Neville Chamberlain, who became British Prime Minister in May 1937, championed a ‘grand strategy’ based on diplomacy. He, along with many others, believed that making concessions to Germany was the best path to European peace.
Chamberlain had indeed read Mein Kampf but dismissed its significance. In contrast, Winston Churchill emerged as a prominent voice of dissent, warning against the dangers of Hitler.
“Churchill had visited Germany in 1932 and seen the growing Nazi threat,” Clements explains. “He began making a series of impassioned speeches in parliament condemning the regime. As part of this, he made frequent and ever-louder calls for British rearmament throughout the 1930s.”
Churchill received secret intelligence about German rearmament, which fueled his lobbying efforts to push the governments of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain to strengthen British military preparedness. While some dismissed Churchill’s warnings as self-promotion or warmongering, he genuinely recognized the threat posed by Hitler and Britain’s lack of readiness.
Despite Churchill’s warnings, Chamberlain continued to pursue appeasement.
Key Events of Appeasement
Chamberlain remained steadfast in his belief in appeasement, even when evidence mounted that it was ineffective against Hitler.
In October 1935, Benito Mussolini, the fascist dictator of Italy, invaded Ethiopia (then Abyssinia). Britain took no action to stop him, and the League of Nations only imposed minor sanctions. Britain and France effectively allowed Italy to conquer Ethiopia. Hitler observed these events, and the lack of strong response emboldened him further.
By 1938, the situation escalated as Germany focused on the Sudetenland, a region of Czechoslovakia bordering Germany with a German-speaking majority. War seemed imminent. France was obligated to protect Czechoslovakia, but neither France nor Britain felt prepared for war. British policy aimed to pressure Czechoslovakia to concede to Hitler’s demands to avoid conflict.
Throughout 1938, intense diplomatic efforts culminated in Chamberlain’s three meetings with Hitler in Germany in September to resolve the Czech crisis. The final meeting was the Munich Conference, attended by leaders from Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. An agreement was reached and signed, crucially without the participation of Czech leaders, on Hitler’s insistence.
Alt text: Map showing Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939, clearly outlining the Sudetenland region ceded to Germany as a result of the Munich Agreement.
Britain and France pressured Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland to Germany. This averted war, but many recognized it as only a temporary “peace without honor.”
Following the Munich Agreement, Chamberlain secured Hitler’s signature on an Anglo-German Declaration. Upon returning to Britain, Chamberlain famously waved this document, proclaiming “peace for our time” to cheering crowds.
In an archive clip, Neville Chamberlain declared, “This morning I had another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is the paper which bears his name upon it as well as mine. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.”
However, behind closed doors, Hitler dismissed the document as insignificant.
Clements elaborates, “We have on display here at the Churchill Museum, that declaration next to a photograph of Chamberlain after he arrived back in Britain. In the lead up to the agreement, war fears had swept the country. Children had been evacuated, there were queues for gas masks and preparations were made for air raid shelters and home defenses. Now that it seemed Chamberlain’s visit to Munich had avoided war, there was widespread joy and Chamberlain was hailed as a hero.”
Despite the public jubilation, not everyone was convinced. Churchill condemned Munich as “a total and unmitigated defeat.” Czechoslovakia lost significant territory and population and felt betrayed by its allies. Hopes that Hitler could be appeased by returning former German colonies in Africa were dashed as Hitler’s ambitions remained focused on Europe. Trust in Hitler’s word eroded rapidly.
The Ultimate Failure of Appeasement
Europe was on a path to war. Appeasement had failed. Just months after Munich, Hitler violated the agreement and occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia. The Munich Agreement proved to be a complete failure, with Hitler discarding it almost immediately.
“Munich came to be seen as a British and French failure and also betrayal,” Clements states. “But it can also be said that because of Munich, Hitler was forced to abandon his planned war of conquest as he saw that he couldn’t risk fighting against Britain and France at that point.”
Appeasement did buy Britain and France valuable time to rearm, as neither nation was truly ready for war in the 1930s. Chamberlain’s approach seemed to be “hope for the best, but prepare for the worst.” However, while rearmament did accelerate in the late 1930s, it can be argued that it was not as robust as it could have been. A significant positive development was the British investment in RADAR technology.
While Chamberlain is often seen as the face of appeasement, he was not alone in advocating for this policy.
Clements points out, “Chamberlain is the main name attached to appeasement, but in fact he was continuing the line taken by his predecessors. Ramsay MacDonald was Prime Minister when Hitler came to power, and he adopted a position of appeasement towards the Nazi regime, and this was continued by his successor Stanley Baldwin.”
Even Churchill, a critic of appeasement, was not inherently opposed to diplomacy. He advocated for international summits to resolve Cold War tensions after working with Stalin during WWII. Churchill’s opposition to appeasement stemmed from his understanding that Hitler was not a reasonable actor who could be negotiated with through concessions.
“Another element in the failure of appeasement is the fact that it isn’t possible to reason with someone who is unreasonable,” Clements concludes.
Sadly, Chamberlain’s perspective on appeasement remains less known, as he died of cancer in November 1940, shortly after resigning as Prime Minister. Churchill, in contrast, wrote extensively about World War II, offering his critical view of appeasement.
Appeasement has become synonymous with weakness, and its failure to prevent war in the 1930s serves as a cautionary tale against making concessions to aggressive dictators. Each concession made to Hitler reinforced his belief that Britain and France lacked resolve, ultimately making war more, not less, likely.
Conclusion
Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement, while ultimately unsuccessful, was driven by a desire to avoid another devastating war. He sought to protect Britain and its empire from a potentially catastrophic conflict and immense loss of life.
Clements summarizes, “He had an extremely difficult task as British Prime Minister in the 1930s, and adopted a course which he believed was worth pursuing to preserve peace.”
Despite its noble intentions, appeasement failed to deter Hitler and ultimately paved the way for World War II, demonstrating the perils of misjudging aggressive dictators and the critical importance of decisive action in the face of tyranny.
