The harrowing events of August 12, 2021, when Jake Davison committed a mass shooting, tragically ending five lives before taking his own, brought a disturbing online subculture into sharper focus. Davison’s extensive digital footprint revealed a trove of misogynistic and anti-feminist sentiments across platforms like Reddit and YouTube, interwoven with references to the “incel” subculture. While some of his later online activity suggested an attempt to distance himself from this ideology, citing its negative impact on his mental health, the prevailing evidence strongly indicates that his involvement with incel beliefs significantly shaped his worldview and potentially contributed to his violent actions.
The term “incel” gained widespread notoriety following the 2014 Isla Vista, California, killings perpetrated by Elliot Rodger. Rodger, prior to his attack, disseminated a video and a lengthy autobiographical manifesto detailing his “involuntary celibacy.” This tragic event served as a chilling introduction to a phenomenon that would, unfortunately, become increasingly visible in subsequent years.
Initially, violence associated with incel ideology appeared to be largely confined to North America, with devastating incidents such as Alek Minassian’s 2018 Toronto van attack, the 2018 Tallahassee Yoga Studio shooting, the 2020 Toronto erotic spa machete attack, and the 2020 shooting at the Westgate Mall in Arizona. These attacks collectively resulted in a death toll nearing 50. However, the geographical scope of incel ideology has expanded. The UK, for instance, has witnessed a growing online engagement with inceldom, exemplified by Davison’s attack and the preceding trials of Gabrielle Friel and Anwar Driouich, both of whom exhibited apparent links to incel beliefs. This global spread underscores the urgent need to understand and address this complex issue.
Decoding the Incel Worldview: What Does “Incel” Mean?
At its core, the incel worldview is predicated on the belief that physical attractiveness is genetically determined. Proponents of this ideology argue that inherent physical traits dictate one’s desirability to women (Baele et al., 2019; Ging 2019; Hoffman et al., 2020). Individuals identifying as incels perceive themselves as lacking these desirable genetic attributes, leading to a conviction that they are “doomed to a life of involuntary celibacy.” The term “incel” itself is a portmanteau of “involuntary celibate,” encapsulating this central tenet of their identity.
Empirical research suggests that this belief system fosters feelings of profound isolation and loneliness. This, in turn, fuels frustration and envy towards those perceived to be in fulfilling sexual relationships (Van Brunt & Taylor, 2021). This sense of alienation and resentment forms the bedrock of the incel experience, driving their engagement within online communities and shaping their interactions with the wider world.
Is Incel Ideology a Form of Extremism? Examining the Ideological Underpinnings
Incel ideology is not born in isolation; it emerges from a broader ecosystem of online anti-woman communities collectively known as the “manosphere.” This digital space encompasses a range of groups, and over time, segments of the manosphere have exhibited increasingly extreme, hostile, and even violent views directed towards women and other groups (Farrell et al., 2019). A concerning trend within the manosphere is the migration of users from comparatively moderate groups, such as Pick-Up Artists and Men’s Rights Activists, towards the more radicalized incel sphere. This shift is marked by a significant escalation in hate speech and open discussions of violence (Baele et al., 2019; Hoffman et al., 2020; Papadamou et al., 2020). In fact, studies have indicated that incel discourse exhibits comparable levels of “toxicity” to notorious far-right platforms like Gab (Ribeiro et al., 2020), highlighting the severity of the problem.
Incel ideology demonstrably exhibits the defining characteristics of extremist ideologies. It operates with a clear “in-group/out-group” dynamic and promotes crisis/solution narratives (Berger, 2018ab), features that are consistently observed across various forms of extremism, from Salafi jihadism to white nationalism.
The incel ideology exhibits all of the hallmarks of an extremist ideology.
Specifically, the incel community is unified by a deeply misogynistic ideology that positions women as genetically inferior to men. They believe women are primarily driven by a biological imperative to reproduce with “genetically superior” males, thus inherently excluding men they deem unattractive, like themselves (Baele et al., 2019).
Research has revealed that the incel worldview is structured around a rigid, immutable, three-tiered social hierarchy, solely based on physical appearance. At the apex are a select few “alpha males” (Chads) and “females” (Stacys). The “Normies,” or average-looking betas, occupy the middle tier. At the bottom resides the exclusively male and marginalized group of incels (Baele et al., 2019).
Within this hierarchical framework, “out-groups” – encompassing women, alphas, and betas – are consistently portrayed in an intensely negative and dehumanizing manner. This dehumanization is achieved through the use of derogatory language and specific terms, such as “femoids” or “roasties” when referring to women. Women are further depicted as emotionally simplistic, driven primarily by sexual desire, and adhering to anti-social values, characterized by infidelity and manipulation of men for sex or financial gain (Baele et al., 2019). Paradoxically, while incels position themselves at the nadir of their social hierarchy, they simultaneously maintain a belief in the inherent superiority of all men, including themselves, over women.
While incels view themselves at the bottom of their hierarchy, they consider all men, including themselves, as superior to women.
This skewed perception of social dynamics leads to a core concept within incel ideology: “pilling.” This concept, borrowed from the 1999 film The Matrix, is also prevalent in certain segments of far-right ideology. “Pilling” presents a binary choice: taking the “blue pill” to remain oblivious to the “true” nature of reality and live in blissful ignorance, or taking the “red pill” to “wake up” and acknowledge the existence of social hierarchies like the one they perceive. Incels have expanded this concept by introducing the “black pill.” The black pill builds upon the red pill’s premise but adds a layer of nihilism, asserting that these social hierarchies are immutable and that any attempt to change them is futile.
The crisis/solution narratives within incel ideology draw heavily on the “politics of profound nostalgia” that characterizes the broader men’s rights movement (Menzies, 2007). This nostalgia manifests as an idealized vision of a mythical patriarchal “golden age” (Baele et al., 2019; O’Malley et al. 2020) characterized by rigid traditional gender roles, where women married young and monogamy was the societal norm. In this fabricated past, all men were supposedly entitled to sexual access to women, which was never denied, and romantic interactions were governed by traditional courtship, rendering physical appearance and mutual pleasure largely irrelevant (Baele et al., 2019).
This nostalgic narrative is intrinsically linked to the incel concept of “female hypergamy” – a form of biological determinism that posits women are inherently driven to seek out and reproduce with “Chads” to propagate their “superior genes.” Incels believe that this supposed hypergamous tendency was suppressed during their imagined golden age by laws and social conventions, ensuring a “fair” distribution of relationships (Baele et al., 2019). Over time, this worldview has intertwined with broader societal and political beliefs. Incels perceive contemporary society as “lookist,” governed by the aforementioned hierarchy, and attribute this state to feminism, liberalism, and technological progress (see Baele, Brace & Coan 2019; Ging 2019; O’Malley 2020; Papadamou et al. 2020; Scaptura & Boyle 2020), all of which they view as oppressive forces against men like themselves.
Analyzing these core tenets reveals that incel ideology is fundamentally supremacist. As Miller-Idriss (2020) notes, while white supremacy is the most visible and lethal manifestation of supremacist thinking, the underlying logic and hierarchical structures are common to all forms of supremacist ideologies. A key characteristic is the dehumanization of the “other” group, coupled with the assertion that this “other” is the source of suffering for the in-group.
Incel Violence and the Question of Terrorism: Are Incels Terrorists?
The aforementioned characteristics, common to extremist ideologies, frequently lead to the justification of violence as a legitimate course of action. While incel ideology can be linked to increased aggression within its adherents, their perspectives on violence present a unique case within the landscape of extremist movements.
Research has documented discussions within incel communities contemplating whether the attacks carried out by figures like Rodger and Minassian could spark an incel uprising, instigate societal shifts in attitudes towards feminism, or even lead to policies forcing women into sexual relationships with men (Baele et al., 2019). However, the dominant sentiment within the incel community appears to be that such acts of violence are unlikely to fundamentally alter the social order. This perspective stems from the nihilistic “black pill” philosophy. Consequently, incel-related violence is often framed within the community not as a means to achieve social change, but rather as a form of personal liberation and revenge.
Acts of incel-related violence tend to be seen by the community as a form of liberating action that constitutes an act of revenge.
This distinction is crucial when analyzing the nature of the incel movement. While a universally agreed-upon definition of terrorism remains elusive among researchers, a central tenet of terrorist violence is generally understood to be the pursuit of an ideological cause with the ultimate goal of achieving social or political transformation. Following this logic, the manifestos and statements from Rodger and Minassian, explicitly aiming to incite rebellion, could potentially classify their actions as terrorism.
However, in the majority of incel-related violent incidents, perpetrators have not articulated such overtly political or societal goals. Their actions often appear to fall into the category of violence committed as a form of personal “release,” intertwined with elements of incel ideology and various social and mental health challenges. As Jonathan Hall, the UK’s independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, points out, a key challenge for prosecutors in terrorism cases is to “establish beyond reasonable doubt that the action was done to advance an ideological cause rather than for some purely personal or emotional reason” (Hall, 2021:31). Nevertheless, Hall (2021) also emphasizes that personal motivations, separate from ideology, do not automatically preclude an act from being classified as terrorism. A growing consensus among researchers suggests that even in cases where mental health issues are present, ideology still plays a significant role (Berger, 2018b). Acts committed by individuals within the more extreme fringes of the incel community, characterized by supremacist narratives and in-group/out-group dynamics, should be considered acts of terrorism (Hoffman & Ware, 2020; Hoffman et al., 2020).
The investigation into the Plymouth incident remains ongoing. It is premature to definitively classify it as an act of terrorism or to predict whether gender-based extremism, exemplified by incel ideology, will be officially designated as a terrorist threat in the UK. However, the fact that Canada’s Security Intelligence Service, a nation significantly impacted by this movement, labeled inceldom as a form of violent misogynistic ideological extremism in 2019, is a noteworthy indicator of evolving perceptions and classifications.
The Link Between Inceldom and the Far-Right: Exploring the Connections
The relationship between the incel movement and the broader far-right is an area of ongoing investigation. While a definitive empirical understanding is still developing, several connections suggest a notable link between the two. Firstly, ideological overlaps exist, particularly in the shared use of hateful language (Hoffman & Ware 2020). Elliot Rodger’s manifesto, for example, incorporated racially charged language, and the perpetrator of the 2020 Hanau attack, who was inspired by far-right ideologies, left behind messages containing misogynistic content (Baele et al., 2020). Secondly, both communities exhibit similar online cultural traits, including the use of internet memes and the concept of “pilling.” Thirdly, some researchers propose that elements within the far-right are actively exploiting the insecurities of young men within incel communities, using anti-female supremacist views as a conduit to recruit them into white supremacist ideologies (Romano, 2018; Hoffman & Ware 2019). However, this recruitment pathway requires further empirical validation.
In conclusion, current evidence suggests that the contemporary far-right is not a monolithic ideology but rather a composite of diverse “flavors” sharing certain overlapping worldviews. A useful analogy is to envision the far-right as a series of overlapping Venn diagrams. Each circle in this diagram represents a specific category within the far-right spectrum – white nationalists, neo-Nazis, militia groups, the alt-right, and so on. Each category possesses distinct ideological elements, but not all elements are universally shared across all categories.
Incel ideology can be considered one of these distinct yet overlapping sets within the broader far-right Venn diagram. It shares characteristics and potentially serves as an entry point into more overtly political far-right extremism for some individuals. Further research is crucial to fully delineate the nature and extent of this complex relationship.
Read more:
- Baele, S., Brace, L. & Coan, T. (2019). From “Incel” to “Saint”: Analyzing the violent worldview behind the 2018 Toronto attack. Terrorism and Political Violence DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2019.1638256
- Baele, S., Brace, L. & Coan, T. (2020). Uncovering the Far-Right Online Ecosystem: An Analytical framework and Research Agenda. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1862895
- Berger, J. (2018a). Extremism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
- Berger, J. (2018b). The Difference between a Killer and a Terrorist. The Atlantic available via: https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/04/the-difference-between-killer-and-terrorist/558998/
- Farrell, T., Fernandez, M., Novotny, J. & Alani, H. (2019). Exploring Misogyny Across the Manosphere in Reddit. WebSci 19: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Web Science, 87–96
- Ging, D. (2019). Alphas, Betas, and Incels: Theorizing the Masculinities of the Manosphere. Men and Masculinities,22(4), 638–657
- Hall, J. (2021). The Terrorism Acts in 2019: report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation on the Operation of the Terrorisms Acts 2000 and 2006 available via: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/972261/THE_TERRORISM_ACTS_IN_2019_REPORT_Accessible.pdf#page23
- Hoffman, B. & Ware, J. (2019). Are We Entering a New Era of far-Right Terrorism? War on the Rocks available via https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-far-right-terrorism/
- Hoffman, B., Ware, J. & Shapiro, E. (2020). Assessing the Threat of Incel Violence. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 43(7), 565–587
- Hoffman, B. & Ware, J. (2020). Incels: America’s Newest Domestic Terrorism Threat. Lawfare Blog available via https://www.lawfareblog.com/incels-americas-newest-domestic-terrorism-threat
- Menzies, R. (2007). Virtual Backlash: representations of Men’s ‘Rights’ and Feminists ‘Wrongs’ in Cyberspace in Chunn, D., Boyd, S. & Lessard, H. (eds.) Reaction and Resistance: Feminism, Law, and Social Change Vancouver: UBC Press
- Miller-Idriss, C. (2020) Hate in the Homeland: the New Global Far Right Woodstock: Princeton University Press
- O’Malley, R., Holt, K., & Holt, T. (2020). An Exploration of the Involuntary Celibate (Incel) Subculture Online. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 1–28
- Papadamou, K., Zannettou, S., Blackburn, J., De Cristofaro, E., Stringhini, G. & Sirivianos, M. (2020). Understanding the Incel Community on YouTube. Arxiv [available online: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.08293v1.pdf] accessed 22/03/2021
- Ribeiro, M., Blackburn, J., Bradlyn, B., De Cristofaro, E., Stringhini, G., Long, S., Greenburg, S. & Zannettou, S. (2020) Arxiv [available via https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.07600]
- Romano, A. (2018). How the Alt-Right’s Sexism Lures men into White Supremacy. Vox available via https://www.vox.com/culture/2016/12/14/13576192/alt-right-sexism-recruitment
- Scaptura, M. & Boyle, K. (2020). Masculinity Threat, “Incel” Traits, and Violent Fantasies Among Heterosexual Men in the United States. Feminist Criminology,15(3), 278–298
- Van brunt, B. & Taylor, C. (2021). Understanding and treating incels: Case Studies, Guidance, and Treatment of Violence Risk in the Involuntary Celibate Community Abingdon: Routledge
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