What is a Virtue? Exploring Moral Excellence and Character

Virtue ethics stands as a cornerstone of normative ethics, offering a compelling perspective that centers on the essence of moral character and virtues. In a landscape often dominated by rules and consequences, virtue ethics asks a fundamental question: “What kind of person should I be?” This approach prioritizes the development of virtuous traits, arguing that ethical behavior stems from a virtuous character. Imagine encountering someone in need of help. While a utilitarian might focus on maximizing overall well-being through assistance, and a deontologist might emphasize a moral duty to help, a virtue ethicist would highlight the virtues of charity or benevolence inherent in the act of helping.

This is not to suggest that virtue ethics exists in isolation from considerations of rules or consequences. Rather, it signifies a shift in emphasis. While other ethical frameworks certainly acknowledge virtues, virtue ethics places them at the very heart of moral theory. Consequentialists may define virtues as qualities that lead to positive outcomes, and deontologists may see them as traits that enable individuals to fulfill their duties. Virtue ethicists, however, take a different stance. They resist the idea of defining virtues solely based on external concepts like consequences or duties. Instead, virtues and their counterparts, vices, become the foundational elements, shaping and informing other ethical notions within the theory.

To truly grasp virtue ethics, it is essential to delve into its core components. Two concepts stand out as particularly crucial: virtue itself and practical wisdom. Understanding these concepts provides a solid foundation for exploring the nuances and diverse forms of virtue ethics. Following this exploration, it is important to consider the criticisms and defenses surrounding virtue ethics, acknowledging the ongoing discourse and evolution of this ethical approach. Finally, examining potential future directions in virtue ethics reveals its dynamic nature and continued relevance in contemporary moral philosophy.

Defining Virtue: The Essence of Moral Character

At its core, a virtue is defined as an excellent trait of character. It is more than just a fleeting habit; it is a deeply ingrained disposition that shapes how a person perceives, values, feels, desires, chooses, acts, and reacts to the world around them. Think of it as a fundamental aspect of one’s being, woven into the fabric of their personality. Possessing a virtue means embodying a particular kind of person with a complex and nuanced mindset.

A crucial aspect of this mindset is the sincere and wholehearted acceptance of a specific range of considerations as valid reasons for action. Consider honesty. An honest person is not merely someone who refrains from cheating or engages in truthful dealings simply because they believe “honesty is the best policy” or fear getting caught. True honesty arises from recognizing the inherent wrongness of dishonesty. For an honest individual, the thought “To do otherwise would be dishonest” serves as a primary motivator. Similarly, honesty isn’t about blurting out every truth without consideration. It’s about discerning when truthfulness is appropriate and when discretion might be necessary. The honest person understands “That would be a lie” as a significant, though not absolute, reason to avoid certain statements, while also recognizing “That would be the truth” as a positive, but again, not overriding, reason to speak.

The values and beliefs of a virtuous person, such as honesty, extend beyond mere actions. They permeate their choices in relationships, environment, and even emotional responses. An individual who values honesty will seek out honest companions, prefer working with integrity-driven colleagues, and strive to instill honesty in their children. They will naturally disapprove of dishonesty, feel aversion towards deceit, and be unmoved by tales of trickery. They will admire and celebrate honesty when it prevails and feel genuine distress when dishonesty surfaces among those they care about.

Given the multifaceted nature of virtue as a disposition that encompasses thoughts, emotions, motivations, and actions, it becomes clear that attributing virtue to someone based on a single action or a limited set of observations is unwise. Especially without understanding the underlying reasons behind their actions, judging someone’s virtue can be profoundly inaccurate.

It’s also vital to acknowledge that virtue is not an all-or-nothing state. It exists on a spectrum. Full or perfect virtue, embodying the ideal, is a rare achievement. Most individuals who are genuinely considered virtuous, and certainly far more virtuous than those characterized by dishonesty or selfishness, still possess areas for improvement, those “blind spots” where their actions might not fully align with virtuous reasoning. Someone largely known for their honesty and kindness, especially in challenging situations, might still harbor minor flaws, such as subtle snobbery or a tendency to be less kind to strangers from different backgrounds.

Furthermore, achieving emotional harmony with one’s rational understanding of virtuous action is a continuous process. One may intellectually recognize the honesty in admitting a mistake, yet struggle internally to do so with ease and without conflict. Drawing inspiration from Aristotle, virtue ethicists distinguish between full virtue and “continence,” or strength of will. Those with full virtue act virtuously without internal resistance, while continent individuals must actively manage conflicting desires or temptations to act otherwise.

While describing continence as “falling short” of perfect virtue might seem to contradict the admiration we often feel for those who act well under pressure, the nuance lies in understanding what makes acting virtuously “hard.” If difficulty stems from external circumstances, such as poverty when encountering a lost purse or grief when a visitor seeks help, then acting virtuously is indeed especially commendable. However, if the difficulty arises from internal character flaws – the temptation to keep what isn’t theirs or indifference to others’ suffering – then the act, while perhaps still good, doesn’t represent the same level of virtuous character.

Alt text: A photograph depicts Major Rodney Yano assisting another soldier, illustrating the virtue of helpfulness and courage in challenging circumstances.

Practical Wisdom: Navigating Virtue in the Real World

Another dimension where individuals may fall short of complete virtue is in the realm of practical wisdom, often referred to as phronesis. This intellectual virtue is crucial for translating virtuous character into effective and morally sound action.

The very concept of virtue is inherently linked to goodness. A virtuous person is, by definition, morally good, admirable, and acts and feels in accordance with what is right. These seem like self-evident truths. However, when we consider specific virtues like generosity, honesty, compassion, or courage, these truisms can become complicated. We might say someone is “generous to a fault,” or that compassion can lead to wrong actions, such as telling an untruthful lie to avoid hurting someone’s feelings. Even courage, in the hands of a criminal, can amplify their capacity for harm. This raises a perplexing question: Can virtues themselves sometimes lead to morally wrong actions? Can someone who embodies virtues like generosity, honesty, compassion, and courage still be morally flawed, or even act wrongly because of these virtues?

This apparent paradox arises from a common, and perhaps overly simplistic, understanding of virtue, often influenced by casual language and a modern tendency to associate virtuous behavior with emotional impulses rather than reasoned choices. If we perceive generosity or honesty as mere inclinations to act on generous or honest feelings, like the urge to give or speak truthfully, or if we view compassion as simply reacting to suffering with emotion-driven actions, and courage as just fearlessness or recklessness in the face of danger, then it’s easy to see how these “virtues” could lead to misguided actions.

However, this interpretation describes what Aristotle termed “natural virtue” – a preliminary stage of virtue, present even in children, awaiting refinement through phronesis or practical wisdom. While children exhibiting these natural virtues (except perhaps “courageous” recklessness) are undoubtedly kind and well-intentioned, we wouldn’t describe them as fully morally virtuous or admirable individuals. Ordinary language, or an overreliance on inclination-based motivation, provides us with this “natural virtue” – a precursor to true virtue that needs practical wisdom to reach its full potential.

Aristotle extensively discussed phronesis, and its precise meaning is still debated among scholars. However, in contemporary understanding, practical wisdom can be best grasped by considering the difference between a virtuous, morally mature adult and a well-intentioned but less experienced child or adolescent. Both may have good intentions, but children are far more likely to make mistakes due to a lack of knowledge and understanding of how to effectively realize their intentions. A virtuous adult, while not infallible, is less prone to such errors, and when mistakes do occur due to lack of knowledge, it is typically not due to culpable ignorance.

Children and adolescents often unintentionally cause harm while trying to help, either because they lack the practical skills to bring about the intended benefit or because their understanding of what is truly beneficial or harmful is limited and often flawed. Such ignorance in young children is rarely considered blameworthy. Adults, however, are held accountable for mistakes stemming from thoughtlessness, insensitivity, recklessness, impulsivity, shortsightedness, or the egocentric assumption that their own preferences apply universally. They are also culpable for flawed understandings of what constitutes genuine benefit or harm. Practical wisdom involves knowing how to effectively achieve real benefits and avoid unintended harm. For example, someone with practical wisdom would understand that concealing a painful truth from someone who needs to hear it, believing it to be an act of kindness, is ultimately misguided and not truly beneficial.

In essence, since good intentions are intentions to act well or “do the right thing,” practical wisdom can be defined as the knowledge and understanding that empowers someone, unlike a naive adolescent, to actually achieve those intentions in any given situation. While a comprehensive definition of practical wisdom remains a topic of ongoing discussion, some key aspects are well-recognized. Even many deontological ethicists now acknowledge that action-guiding rules cannot be reliably applied without practical wisdom. Correct application necessitates “situational appreciation” – the ability to discern the morally relevant features in a specific context. This highlights two key facets of practical wisdom.

Firstly, practical wisdom is typically acquired through life experience. Morally relevant aspects of a situation often include the potential consequences of an action on those involved, something adolescents, due to their inexperience, often struggle to grasp. Wisdom about human nature and the complexities of life is integral to practical wisdom. (It should be self-evident that virtuous individuals are mindful of the consequences of their actions. To ignore consequences would be to act recklessly, thoughtlessly, and shortsightedly.)

Secondly, practically wise individuals possess the ability to prioritize and discern the relative importance of different features within a situation. They can identify the most relevant factors, sometimes even recognizing a single factor as paramount in a given context. Unlike less mature individuals who might weigh personal inconvenience against ethical considerations like honesty or benevolence, the wise person understands the true weight and priority of moral values.

These aspects converge in the description of the practically wise as individuals who understand what holds genuine worth, what is truly important, and consequently, what is truly advantageous in life. They possess the knowledge of how to live well, not just in a narrow, self-serving sense, but in a morally rich and fulfilling way.

Alt text: A photograph of a fork in a road on Mount Tamalpais symbolizes the choices and discernment required for practical wisdom in navigating life’s moral dilemmas.

Diverse Forms of Virtue Ethics: Different Paths to Moral Excellence

While all forms of virtue ethics share a common ground in emphasizing the centrality of virtue and the necessity of practical wisdom, they diverge in how they integrate these and other concepts to illuminate moral action and guide a fulfilling life. Contemporary virtue ethics encompasses a spectrum of approaches, each offering a unique perspective on the nature and application of virtue. Four prominent forms stand out: eudaimonist virtue ethics, agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, target-centered virtue ethics, and Platonistic virtue ethics.

Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics: Virtue as Flourishing

Eudaimonist virtue ethics is distinguished by its definition of virtues in relation to eudaimonia, often translated as “happiness” or “flourishing.” In this view, a virtue is a character trait that contributes to or constitutes eudaimonia. The rationale for cultivating virtues, according to eudaimonists, is precisely because they are essential for achieving eudaimonia.

The concept of eudaimonia is a cornerstone of ancient Greek moral philosophy. While “happiness” is a common translation, it can be misleading in modern usage, where happiness is often seen as a subjective and fleeting emotional state. “Flourishing” captures the meaning of eudaimonia more accurately, as it implies a state of objective well-being, encompassing not just feeling good but also living well and fulfilling one’s potential as a human being. Unlike subjective happiness, one can be mistaken about whether their life is truly eudaimon. It is possible to believe one is flourishing while in reality, one’s life might be lacking in crucial aspects of genuine well-being. Eudaimonia is a “moralized” or value-laden concept of happiness – it’s about true or real happiness, the kind of happiness worth pursuing and experiencing. It is a concept about which reasonable people, holding different views of human life, can have substantive disagreements that cannot be easily resolved by appealing to a neutral, external standard.

Most forms of virtue ethics concur that living virtuously is a necessary condition for eudaimonia. This ultimate good is not seen as separate from virtue, composed of non-moral goods to which virtue merely contributes. Instead, virtuous activity is considered at least partially constitutive of eudaimonia. Eudaimonist virtue ethics thus argues that a life primarily focused on physical pleasure or material wealth is not a eudaimon life, but rather a wasted life.

While the conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia is central to eudaimonist virtue ethics, the specific nature of this link varies. Aristotle believed virtue is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia; external factors like good fortune also play a role. Plato and the Stoics, on the other hand, held that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia, suggesting that true flourishing is attainable solely through virtue, regardless of external circumstances.

In eudaimonist virtue ethics, the good life is the eudaimon life, and virtues are the qualities that enable human beings to achieve eudaimonia. Virtues are valuable because they contribute to this ultimate flourishing, barring extreme misfortune. This establishes a direct connection between eudaimonia and what qualifies a character trait as a virtue.

Agent-Based and Exemplarist Virtue Ethics: The Moral Agent as the Foundation

Agent-based virtue ethics offers a different perspective, shifting the focus from eudaimonia to the moral agent themselves. Rather than deriving the value of virtue from its contribution to flourishing, agent-based approaches argue that normativity, including the value of eudaimonia, originates from and is explained by the motivations and character of moral agents.

The extent to which other normative concepts must be explained through agent qualities varies among agent-based theorists. Prominent figures like Michael Slote and Linda Zagzebski advocate for a comprehensive agent-based approach, grounding a wide range of normative qualities in agent characteristics. For instance, Slote defines rightness and wrongness in terms of agent motivations: right actions stem from good motivations, and wrong actions from bad or insufficiently good motives. He further extends this agent-centered approach to explain the goodness of actions, the value of eudaimonia, the justice of institutions, and even the normativity of practical reason, all rooted in the motivational and dispositional qualities of moral agents. Zagzebski similarly defines right and wrong actions by referencing the emotions, motives, and dispositions of virtuous and vicious individuals. A wrong action, in her view, is one that a virtuous person would characteristically avoid and feel guilt for, an action that expresses vice and violates the requirements of virtue. She extends this framework to define duties, good and bad ends, and good and bad states of affairs, all ultimately grounded in the character of exemplary agents.

However, less encompassing agent-based virtue ethics theories are also possible. At minimum, an agent-based approach must explain what one ought to do by referencing the motivational and dispositional states of agents. But this alone doesn’t fully define an agent-based approach, as all virtue ethics theories, to some extent, consider agent motivations. For a theory to be genuinely agent-based, the normativity of motivations and dispositions must be explained without relying on other, more fundamental normative concepts like eudaimonia or external states of affairs.

Within this broad agent-based framework, variations arise, particularly in how motivations and dispositions are deemed relevant for explaining other normative qualities. Slote emphasizes the actual motives and dispositions of the specific agent performing an action. The goodness of an action is directly determined by the agent’s motives at the time of performance. Zagzebski, conversely, focuses on the hypothetical motives and dispositions of a virtuous agent. An action is right or wrong based on whether a virtuous agent, motivated by virtue, would perform such an action. This allows Zagzebski to distinguish between performing the right action and doing it for the right reasons, a distinction that Slote’s approach struggles with.

Another point of divergence within agent-based virtue ethics lies in identifying virtuous motivations and dispositions. Zagzebski’s exemplarist account proposes that “We do not have criteria for goodness in advance of identifying the exemplars of goodness.” We learn about virtue by observing people around us, identifying those we admire and wish to emulate as positive exemplars, and those we find undesirable as negative exemplars. Our understanding of good and bad motivations, virtuous and vicious dispositions, is rooted in these fundamental responses to exemplars. This doesn’t mean we consciously ask ourselves, “What would my exemplar do?” in every situation. Our moral concepts refine over time as we encounter diverse exemplars, identify commonalities and differences, and discern their moral significance. Recognizable patterns of motivation emerge, become labeled as virtues or vices, and shape our understanding of obligations and desirable ends. However, even with sophisticated moral reasoning, exemplarism maintains that our moral framework ultimately rests on our basic inclination to admire (or dislike) certain exemplars. While exemplarist theory offers a specific account of how we understand virtue, one could be an agent-based virtue ethicist without adopting exemplarist epistemology.

Target-Centered Virtue Ethics: Hitting the Mark of Virtue

Target-centered virtue ethics, developed by Christine Swanton, takes a different starting point. Instead of eudaimonia or exemplary agents, it begins with our pre-existing understanding of virtues. We already have a general sense of which traits are virtues and what they entail. While this initial understanding can be refined and deepened, the target-centered view starts with the common recognition of virtues like generosity, courage, self-discipline, and compassion as inherently good. It then proceeds to analyze what these traits truly involve.

A comprehensive account of a virtue, in this view, maps out four key aspects: its field, mode of responsiveness, basis of moral acknowledgment, and target. Different virtues operate within different fields. Courage concerns situations involving potential harm, while generosity relates to sharing resources. The basis of acknowledgment is the specific feature within a virtue’s field that it responds to. Generosity responds to the potential benefit one’s actions could bring to others, while courage responds to threats to values, status, or relationships, and the fear these threats evoke. A virtue’s mode describes how it responds to its basis of acknowledgment within its field. Generosity promotes another’s well-being, while courage defends values or relationships. Finally, a virtue’s target is its aim or goal. Courage aims to manage fear and handle danger effectively, while generosity aims to share resources in ways that benefit others.

According to target-centered virtue ethics, a virtue is “a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way.” A virtuous act is one that successfully hits the target of a virtue, effectively responding to relevant factors in its field in the appropriate manner. Defining “right action” within this framework requires moving beyond individual virtues, as real-world situations often involve multiple, overlapping virtue fields. For example, determination might drive someone to complete a challenging task, while love for family might call for prioritizing time with them. To address this, target-centered ethics must explain how to navigate potentially conflicting demands from different virtues. Swanton proposes three possible approaches: a perfectionist account defines right action as the overall most virtuous action possible in the circumstances. A more permissive account allows for actions to be considered right if they are “good enough,” even if not the absolute best option. A minimalist account sets an even lower bar, defining right action as simply not being overall vicious.

Platonistic Virtue Ethics: Contemplating the Good

Platonistic virtue ethics, drawing inspiration from Plato, represents another distinct form. Plato’s dialogues extensively explore the nature of virtues like justice, courage, piety, and wisdom. While Plato is undoubtedly a virtue theorist, whether he should be classified as a virtue ethicist is debated. However, his influence on the resurgence of virtue ethics is undeniable, with many contemporary virtue ethicists being Plato scholars. While some Platonistic scholars have leaned towards eudaimonist interpretations, two variants deserve separate consideration.

Timothy Chappell identifies the defining feature of Platonistic virtue ethics as the idea that “Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good.” Following Iris Murdoch, Chappell emphasizes the “fat relentless ego” as the primary obstacle in moral life. Our constant focus on personal needs and desires distorts our perception of reality and blinds us to genuine goodness. Contemplating goodness, attentively focusing on something “for its own sake, in order to understand it,” disrupts this self-centered tendency. Regular contemplation of goodness cultivates new thought patterns that are less self-absorbed and more attuned to the world beyond the self. This process alters our consciousness, and “anything which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity, and realism is to be connected with virtue.” Virtues, then, are defined as qualities that help us “pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is.” Good agency emerges from possessing and exercising such virtues. In this framework, not all normative properties are defined by virtue, particularly goodness itself. However, the kind of goodness attainable for humans is defined by virtue, and any guidance on action or living well will rely on virtues.

Robert Merrihew Adams presents another Platonistic variant, starting not with consciousness of goodness but with the metaphysics of goodness. Like Murdoch, Adams’s concept of goodness centers on a supremely perfect good, which he, drawing from Augustine, identifies as God. God is both the embodiment and source of all goodness. Other things are good to the extent they resemble God.

Resemblance to God is a necessary but not sufficient condition for goodness. Finite beings can resemble God in ways unsuitable to their nature. For example, while omniscience is a divine attribute, the belief “I am all-knowing” would be false and undesirable in a human. To refine the concept of goodness, Adams introduces “fitting response to goodness,” which he identifies as love. Love distinguishes appropriate resemblances: “being excellent in the way that a finite thing can be consists in resembling God in a way that could serve God as a reason for loving the thing.”

Virtues enter this framework as ways in which persons can resemble God. Adams highlights that “most of the excellences that are most important to us… are excellences of persons or of qualities or actions or works or lives or stories of persons.” This is a reason for conceiving of perfection as a personal God rather than an impersonal Form of the Good. Many of the excellences we value most in persons are virtues like love, wisdom, justice, patience, and generosity, often attributed to divine beings in theistic traditions.

Adams’s Platonistic account in Finite and Infinite Goods doesn’t derive all normative properties from virtues. Goodness is the foundational normative concept. Virtues are not built upon goodness but rather form part of its foundation, as a primary form of goodness we recognize and value. Obligations, in contrast, arise at a different level, determined by expectations and demands within valuable relationships or systems of relationships. The more virtuous the participants in a relationship, the stronger the obligation. Thus, in Adams’s view, good (including virtue) precedes right. However, once obligations emerge from good relationships, they take on their own independent force, their bindingness not directly tied to considerations of goodness but to the expectations and dynamics of the relationship.

Objections and Responses: Navigating the Challenges to Virtue Ethics

Despite its rich history and contemporary resurgence, virtue ethics has faced several objections, some directed more at specific forms than others. These objections, and the responses they have generated, have been crucial in refining and strengthening virtue ethics as a viable ethical framework. Eight prominent objections deserve consideration: application, adequacy, relativism, conflict, self-effacement, justification, egoism, and situationism.

Application Problem: Can Virtue Ethics Provide Action Guidance?

Early in virtue ethics’ revival, it was sometimes associated with an “anti-codifiability” stance against the prevailing emphasis on rules and principles in normative theory. Utilitarians and deontologists often (though not always) aimed to create ethical codes based on universal rules or principles. These codes were expected to: (i) serve as decision procedures for determining right action in any situation; and (ii) be understandable and applicable even by non-virtuous individuals.

Virtue ethicists challenged this, arguing that creating such a code was unrealistic. Attempts to develop and use such codes, particularly in the burgeoning field of bioethics in the 1960s and 70s, seemed to support the virtue ethicist critique. Utilitarians and deontologists often agreed on general rules but diverged sharply on specific, controversial moral issues. It became increasingly clear that moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, and experience-informed judgment – phronesis – were essential for properly applying rules and principles. Consequently, many utilitarians and deontologists moved away from claim (ii), and less emphasis was placed on (i).

Nevertheless, the criticism that virtue ethics lacks codifiable principles and therefore cannot provide action guidance persists. Initially, this objection stemmed from a misunderstanding. Slogans describing virtue ethics as “concerned with Being rather than Doing,” focusing on “What sort of person should I be?” rather than “What should I do?” and being “agent-centered rather than act-centered,” led critics to conclude it was incapable of offering action guidance. Thus, it was seen as a supplement to, not a rival of, utilitarianism and deontology. The simplistic and inaccurate portrayal suggested virtue ethics offered only “Identify a moral exemplar and do what he would do,” as if a student choosing between music and engineering should ask, “What would Socrates do?”

This objection overlooked Anscombe’s suggestion that virtue and vice terms (“v-rules”) could provide specific action guidance, such as “Do what is honest/charitable; do not do what is dishonest/uncharitable.” The richness of our vice vocabulary, far exceeding deontological rules, offers invaluable guidance in avoiding undesirable actions: irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, selfish, mercenary, indiscreet, tactless, arrogant, unsympathetic, cold, incautious, unenterprising, pusillanimous, feeble, presumptuous, rude, hypocritical, self-indulgent, materialistic, grasping, short-sighted, vindictive, calculating, ungrateful, grudging, brutal, profligate, disloyal, and many more.

Adequacy Problem: Can Virtue Ethics Account for Right Action?

A closely related objection questions whether virtue ethics can adequately explain right action. This concern has two facets. (i) Extensional inadequacy: One might argue that right actions can be performed without virtue, and virtuous individuals can sometimes act wrongly without compromising their virtuous character. If virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for right action, the link between rightness/wrongness and virtue/vice might seem too weak to ground the former in the latter. (ii) Explanatory inadequacy: Even if virtue ethics could identify all right actions, one might argue that virtue isn’t always the reason why an action is right.

Some virtue ethicists address the adequacy objection by questioning the need for virtue ethics to provide an account of right action in the first place. Following Anscombe and MacIntyre, Talbot Brewer argues that focusing on “rightness” and “wrongness” is misguided. Contemporary concepts of right and wrong, built around duty linked to divine or moral law or obligation defined against self-interest, carry baggage virtue ethics is better off without. Virtue ethics can address how to live, what kind of person to become, and even what to do, without needing to define “right action.” Instead, it can prioritize aretaic concepts (virtues and vices) and axiological concepts (good and bad, better and worse), while minimizing or avoiding deontic notions like right/wrong action, duty, and obligation.

Other virtue ethicists retain the concept of right action but acknowledge its multiple meanings. “Right action” can refer to the best possible action, a commendable action (even if not the best), or an action that is not blameworthy (even if not commendable). A virtue ethicist might define one of these meanings, such as “best action,” in terms of virtues and vices, while using other normative concepts, like legitimate expectations, for other meanings of “right action.”

As discussed earlier, virtue ethics need not reduce all normative concepts to virtues and vices. It only requires (i) that virtue not be reduced to a more fundamental normative concept and (ii) that some other normative concepts are explained through virtue and vice. This weakens the adequacy objection, which is strongest against virtue ethics attempting to define all senses of “right action” solely through virtues. Using both virtues and vices improves extensional adequacy. Incorporating irreducible normative concepts further enhances both extensional and explanatory adequacy. The necessity and number of such additional concepts remain debated among virtue ethicists, as does the very need for virtue ethics to define right action. Regardless, virtue ethicists have resources to address the adequacy objection.

Relativism Problem: Are Virtues Culturally Dependent?

The charge of cultural relativism is a common objection. Different cultures seem to embody different virtues, suggesting that v-rules might define right and wrong actions only relative to specific cultures. Responses to this charge vary. One, the tu quoque (“you too”) response, is a common defensive strategy for virtue ethicists. It acknowledges cultural relativism as a challenge but argues it is equally problematic for deontology and consequentialism. Cultural variation in perceived virtues is no greater, and arguably less, than cultural variation in rules of conduct or conceptions of happiness and well-being. Cultural relativity is a general problem for all three approaches, related to the broader “justification problem” – justifying moral beliefs to those who disagree, whether skeptics, pluralists, or individuals from different cultures.

A bolder strategy argues that virtue ethics actually handles cultural relativism better than other approaches. Cultural disagreements often stem from local interpretations of virtues, while the virtues themselves are not culturally relative.

Conflict Problem: Resolving Dilemmas in Virtue Ethics

“The conflict problem” arises from apparent dilemmas where different virtues seem to conflict, pointing to opposing actions. Charity might suggest ending the suffering of someone who is terminally ill, while justice forbids killing. Honesty might demand revealing a hurtful truth, while kindness and compassion might suggest silence or even a lie. How does virtue ethics resolve such conflicts? Similar dilemmas arise from conflicting deontological rules. Both deontology and virtue ethics face this conflict problem (and accept it rather than resorting to consequentialist resolutions). Their strategies for addressing it are parallel. Both aim to resolve dilemmas by arguing that the conflict is often only apparent. Practical wisdom, a discriminating understanding of virtues or rules, reveals that in specific cases, virtues don’t truly conflict, or one virtue takes precedence, or rules have implicit exceptions. Whether this fully resolves all dilemmas depends on whether irresolvable dilemmas exist. If they do, proponents of both approaches reasonably argue that attempting to resolve what is inherently irresolvable is a mistake.

Self-Effacement Problem: Should Virtuous Motives Be Explicit?

The “self-effacement problem,” potentially shared by all three ethical approaches, arises when an ethical theory’s justification for an action should not be the agent’s motive for performing it. Michael Stocker originally raised this for deontology and consequentialism, noting that visiting a sick friend motivated by duty or maximizing happiness diminishes the act’s value. Simon Keller argues virtue ethics faces a similar issue: visiting a friend because it’s what a virtuous person would do is also less appealing. However, virtue ethics defenders argue that not all forms of virtue ethics are susceptible to this objection, and those that are are not severely undermined.

Justification Problem: Grounding Virtue Ethics

“The justification problem,” common to utilitarianism and deontology, concerns justifying ethical beliefs. Metaethically, it’s about grounding ethics, a debated issue. For deontology, it’s justifying moral rules; for utilitarianism, it’s justifying the primacy of happiness or well-being. For virtue ethics, it’s justifying which character traits are virtues.

Metaethical debates involve disagreement about external foundations for ethics – external to ethical beliefs themselves. Similar disagreement exists among deontologists and utilitarians. Some believe their normative ethics can be grounded in external bases like rational desires or universal agreement, resistant to skepticism; others don’t.

Virtue ethicists have largely avoided grounding virtue ethics in external foundations, while still maintaining the validity of their claims. Some adopt Rawlsian coherentism; neo-Aristotelians lean towards ethical naturalism.

Misunderstanding eudaimonia as an unmoralized concept leads some critics to mistakenly believe neo-Aristotelians ground virtue in a scientific account of human flourishing. Others assume that without this, their virtue claims are mere rationalizations of personal or cultural values. They are accused of either illegitimately relying on Aristotle’s outdated natural teleology or simply projecting subjective values. However, McDowell, Foot, MacIntyre, and Hursthouse propose a third way: eudaimonia in virtue ethics is moralized, but not only moralized. Claims about human flourishing are informed by scientific facts about human nature, just as claims about elephant flourishing are ethologically grounded. Both depend partly on the nature of the animal, their capacities, desires, and interests.

Modern science, including evolutionary theory and psychology, supports the ancient Greek view of humans as social animals, like elephants and wolves, unlike solitary polar bears. Social contract-like rationalizations are unnecessary to explain our sociality. Like other social animals, our natural impulses include altruistic and cooperative tendencies, not just egoistic drives. This biological reality supports the claim that virtues are partially constitutive of human flourishing and weakens the egoism objection.

Egoism Problem: Is Virtue Ethics Self-Centered?

The “egoism objection” stems from various sources. One is a simple misunderstanding. When it’s understood that virtuous agents act effortlessly and without inner conflict, it’s wrongly concluded that “they only do what they want and are therefore selfish.” So, a generous person giving gladly is somehow less generous than someone who gives grudgingly out of obligation. A related misconception ascribes flawed motivations to virtuous agents, assuming they act virtuously because they believe it will lead to eudaimonia. But “virtuous agent” simply means “agent with virtues,” and virtues inherently include specific reasons for action. Virtuous actions arise from recognizing the inherent value in averting suffering, benefiting others, establishing truth, repaying debts, and so on.

Eudaimonia is achieved through a life of virtuous activity, but this is consistent with virtuous individuals sacrificing their own lives. Courageous, honest, loyal, and charitable individuals wholeheartedly recognize certain considerations as reasons for action, compelling them to face danger for a worthy cause, speak truth in defense of others, or refuse to betray comrades, even at mortal risk. They might share their last resources and face starvation. In the view that virtue is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia, such cases are seen as unfortunate circumstances where eudaimonia becomes unattainable. In the Stoic view, where virtue is both necessary and sufficient, a eudaimon life is a successfully lived life (success not being materialistic), and these individuals die knowing they have lived successfully and brought their lives to a successful completion. Such heroic acts are hardly egoistic.

The misconceived distinction between “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” virtues also fuels egoism objections. Those unfamiliar with ancient traditions might see justice and benevolence as true virtues benefiting others, while dismissing prudence, fortitude, and providence as “self-regarding” and less virtuous. This is doubly flawed. Firstly, justice and benevolence generally do benefit their possessors, as they are essential for eudaimonia. Secondly, in social life, “self-regarding” virtues also benefit others. Those lacking them burden and distress those around them.

Situationist Problem: Does Character Exist at All?

The most recent objection, the “situationist challenge,” claims that social psychology research shows character traits, and thus virtues, don’t exist. Situationist studies suggest behavior is primarily determined by situational factors, not stable character traits. In response, some virtue ethicists argue that situationist studies are irrelevant to the multi-track dispositional nature of virtue. Acknowledging virtue’s complexity, they agree that attributing demanding virtues like charity based on limited observations of “conventional decency” is a “fundamental attribution error.” Others have developed alternative, empirically grounded conceptions of character traits. Still others, like Adams, steer a middle course, acknowledging “frail and fragmentary” character traits as virtues, requiring less character integration than the Aristotelian ideal of phronesis-driven virtue. However, sacrificing practical wisdom as central to all virtues, as Adams does, is a significant compromise.

While the “situationist challenge” hasn’t fundamentally shaken traditional virtue ethics, it has spurred valuable engagement with empirical psychology, fueled by interest in Foot’s Natural Goodness and the growing field of character education.

Future Directions: Expanding the Horizons of Virtue Ethics

For the past three decades, neo-Aristotelian, eudaimonist frameworks have dominated virtue ethics. However, as explored earlier, diverse forms are emerging. Theorists are drawing inspiration from philosophers like Hutcheson, Hume, Nietzsche, Martineau, and Heidegger to develop alternative approaches. Eastern philosophical traditions, such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, are also being explored, promising new avenues for virtue ethics.

Despite its growth, virtue ethics remains less prevalent than deontology and consequentialism, particularly in applied ethics. Textbooks on “moral problems” or “applied ethics” often struggle to include virtue ethics perspectives on specific issues. However, applied virtue ethics has gained momentum in recent years, with growing attention to areas like bioethics, business ethics, and environmental ethics. Environmental ethics, in particular, appears to be a fruitful area for applying virtue ethics.

The potential for “virtue politics” – extending virtue ethics into political philosophy – is less clear. Aristotle’s ethics is deeply intertwined with his politics, suggesting resources for virtue politics within Aristotelian virtue ethics. However, Plato and Aristotle, while insightful for virtue ethics, are less appealing sources for political thought. Yet, recent work suggests Aristotelian ideas can inform a liberal political philosophy. Furthermore, non-Aristotelian virtue ethics, like those of Hutcheson and Hume, might naturally extend into modern political philosophy.

Moral education, emphasizing character training rather than rule inculcation, has always been central to virtue ethics. A growing virtue education movement involves academics and educators. This field is engaging with psychology, educational theory, and theology.

Finally, studying specific virtues and vices has become a productive area within virtue ethics. Studies of cardinal virtues and capital vices, as well as less-discussed virtues like civility, decency, truthfulness, ambition, and meekness, are expanding our understanding. Questions arise about the number of virtues and their interrelationships. Some virtue ethicists embrace a plurality of virtues, while others seek to organize them, perhaps through cardinal virtues and subordinate virtues, to address issues like right action and conflict resolution. Exploring individual virtues and their connections remains a crucial direction for future research in virtue ethics.

By continually engaging with objections, exploring new theoretical avenues, and expanding into applied and interdisciplinary areas, virtue ethics continues to evolve and offer valuable insights into moral life and character development. Its focus on “What Is A Virtue” and “what kind of person should I be?” ensures its enduring relevance in the ongoing quest for ethical understanding.

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